Security

Private vault content, encrypted on your device.

Everything in your vault is locked on your own device before it reaches us, with keys only you hold. Below, each part is explained in plain words, with the technical detail underneath.

Last reviewed . A few features you choose need our systems to read something. The main one is AI help with your Book of Life: the writing you pick passes through our servers to Anthropic to compose it, or to OpenAI for writing help, only with your consent, and the book is encrypted before it is stored. Each one is listed below.

Locked before it leaves your device

Your files, journal, will and stories are encrypted on your phone or computer. We store the locked copy and never hold a key that opens it.

Under the hood

AES-256-GCM with a random key for every file. Those keys are locked by a random 256-bit Master Key that only your vault password, recovery key or passkey can unlock.

A key for each person you choose

Everyone you name for Trusted Delivery gets their own access key, made on your device, which you hand over yourself ahead of time. Henedo cannot recover or reissue it.

Under the hood

A random 256-bit key per contact, written as 44 characters, sealing what you prepared for them. You can ask Henedo to email it once instead; our email system then sees it too.

You decide when

If you stop checking in, warnings go out over several weeks. Only when the last one goes unanswered does each person’s delivery open. A check-in before then resets everything.

Under the hood

Encryption decides who can read; the server’s schedule decides when a delivery becomes available. A delivery that started can still be cancelled within its window.

Encryption

Four steps, all on your device.

None of this happens on our servers. Your browser does every step, so all we ever receive is the result: locked data and locked keys.

  1. You set a vault password

    It must be different from the password you sign in with. Your device turns it into a key, slowly on purpose, and our server checks every try with a key kept outside our database, so a stolen copy of the database cannot be used to guess it. Henedo never receives the password itself, and with Extreme protection there is none.

  2. Every file gets its own key

    Each file, photo and recording is locked with a fresh random key. Any change to the locked copy is detected when it is opened.

  3. The keys are locked too

    Every file key is locked by your Master Key, and the Master Key by your vault password. Changing the password replaces only that outer lock.

  4. Only the locked copy travels

    The locked file goes to storage over an encrypted connection. Its name, preview, and the date and place a photo was taken are locked the same way.

Under the hood: the key chain

Pseudocode, v5 vault password
// v5 vault password (illustrative, not runnable).// Your browser does every step except H;// signing in never derives any of it.S   = HKDF-SHA256(  Argon2id(vaultPassword, salt16, m=128 MiB, t=3, p=4),  info='henedo-vault-stretch-v5')T   = HKDF-SHA256(S,        info='henedo-vault-hardening-query-v5')// Our server returns H only for the right password,// with a growing wait after repeated wrong tries.// H is bound to your account and this salt, each// salt is issued once, and the key behind H is// never stored in our database.H   = vaultPasswordCheck(T, salt16)KEK = HKDF-SHA256(S ‖ H, info='henedo-vault-kek-v5')MK  = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(KEK, EMK, mkIv,        AAD='henedo:vault-password:5:' + userId)// A random key per file protects its body.FEK        = randomBytes(32)ciphertext = AES-256-GCM.encrypt(FEK, randomIv12, file)EFEK       = AES-256-GCM.encrypt(MK, fekIv, FEK)// Files from 50 MiB, and recordings: 8 MiB frames,// each bound to its position and the frame count, so// frames cannot be reordered, swapped or cut off.

Henedo cannot reset your vault password. Signing in, or resetting your sign-in password, never opens your vault. Keep your vault password and recovery key safe; a passkey or recovery shares you set up earlier also work. If every way in is lost, the content stays locked, for us as well.

Why we ask for a strong vault password. A copy of our database cannot be used to guess it: every try goes through our server, which checks it with a key kept outside the database and slows down repeated wrong tries. Someone who also took that key could guess offline, so Henedo accepts vault passwords estimated to need about ten billion guesses, and refuses the password you just signed in with. Three or four unrelated, less common words, or a short sentence only you would think of, is the easiest way there, and your password manager can suggest one.

Memories are locked the same way. Voice notes, video, journal entries and Life Story answers are encrypted on your device like files, so our servers cannot transcribe, caption or preview them.

Protection levels

Choose how much it takes to get in.

You pick a level when you create your vault and can change it in Settings. Every level emails you the first time a new device opens your vault on its own; the higher ones add a sign-in code and can remove the vault password entirely.

Normal

Your vault password opens your vault on any device you sign in on, and we email you the first time a new device opens it on its own. The default, right for most people and the easiest to live with.

Under the hood

Sign in with your password or Google. A passkey, your recovery key or a paired device also opens the vault.

Advanced

Everything in Normal, plus a code from an authenticator app each time you sign in, with Google too. Knowing both your passwords is no longer enough to get in.

Under the hood

Once the code is set up, our servers refuse a session that has not entered it. Two-factor cannot be turned off while Advanced is on: you lower the level first, and we email you when you do.

Extreme

Everything in Advanced, with no vault password at all. Only a passkey, your recovery key or a device where your vault is already open can open it, so there is no password for anyone to guess.

Under the hood

This turns on Maximum protection: the password-locked copy of your Master Key and its server check are deleted. It needs a confirmed recovery key and a passkey first, and your last passkey cannot be removed. Lose them all and no one, Henedo included, can restore access.

Setting up your vault

  1. Choose a level

    Normal is chosen for you. Pick another now or change it later in Settings.

  2. Add sign-in codes

    Advanced and Extreme only. Scan a code with your authenticator app and save ten recovery codes. Google-only accounts also add a sign-in password.

  3. Set a vault password

    Different from the password you sign in with. Extreme never asks for one.

  4. Save your recovery key

    Shown once. Type back one group of it, chosen at random, before it counts.

  5. Add a passkey

    Optional with Normal and Advanced. Extreme needs one, then removes the vault password once you confirm.

Signing in, and hearing about it

An email when a new device gets in

The first time a phone or computer opens your vault with your password, a passkey or your recovery key, at any level, we email you what the device said it was, how it got in and when, with what to do if it was not you.

Under the hood

Your browser keeps a random secret and sends a token made from it for your account alone; our server stores only a hash of the token. Password unlocks are checked by our server, so a modified app cannot skip the email. Pairing, which you approve on a device already open, sends none. At most five a day.

Two-factor sign-in

Codes from an authenticator app, with ten single-use recovery codes. Once it is on, signing in with Google asks for the code too, and turning it off asks for your sign-in password and emails you.

Under the hood

Our servers and database refuse a session that has not entered the code, apart from the few steps that spend a recovery code, finish a reset you confirmed by email, or email you. The code guards your account, never your vault: no key depends on it.

A lost phone is not a lost account

A recovery code switches two-factor off so you can sign in and set it up again. If you opted in to emailed codes, we can email you one. With neither, support can start a reset: you confirm it from your inbox and finish it 3 days later with your password. Meanwhile an emailed check-in link keeps Trusted Delivery waiting.

Under the hood

Nothing reachable before the code acts on a password alone: each step spends a code or mails your own address. With emailed codes on, your inbox alone can get past two-factor; that is the trade. A support reset needs your inbox and your password, waits 3 days, and every email about it can cancel it.

What we see

What we can see, and what we never can.

Encryption hides what you keep, not the fact that you keep it. To run your account and reach the people you chose, our systems still handle some information. This is the complete split.

Never readable by Henedo

  • Your files and photos, their names, folder names and previews
  • Where and when a photo was taken
  • Journal entries, voice notes and videos
  • Your will, Life Story answers and Book of Life
  • Your private records of people and places
  • The answers your family gives to your Ask questions
  • Secure records: wallet recovery phrases, logins and private notes
  • What you prepare for each legacy contact
  • What is inside a time capsule, unless you ask Henedo to deliver it (see below)
  • What people write back to your capsules

Under the hood

Encrypted in your browser with keys that come from your vault password, recovery key or passkey (AES-256-GCM). A photo’s place and date are sealed in a fixed-size record, so even its length gives nothing away.

Handled by our systems

  • Your email address, name, phone number and date of birth
  • Names and contact details of the people you add, and the questions you send through Ask
  • Who you are connected to, and a capsule’s title, file names, recipient and delivery date
  • File sizes, file types, dates and how your folders are arranged
  • When you check in, and where Trusted Delivery stands
  • Your protection level, and the devices that opened your vault, as each browser describes itself
  • Copies of the emails we send, for up to 180 days
  • Billing details, which Stripe processes
  • Your IP address and browser, for security, until 90 days after a session ends

Under the hood

Contact details, capsule recipients and titles, and Ask questions are encrypted at rest with a key our servers hold (AES-256 in the database), so a stolen backup is unreadable; our running systems decrypt them to send email. Addresses are matched with a keyed hash (HMAC-SHA-256).

What our servers store for each key, and what never reaches them
Key or dataWhat our servers storeWhat never reaches us
Master KeyLocked by your vault passwordThe locked key and its salt: emk, kdf_salt. The salt is not secret. A check value for your vault password, which cannot test a guess without a key kept outside the database.Your vault password, the key made from it, or the unlocked Master Key
File keysOne per fileEach key, locked by your Master Key: efekAny file key in usable form
FilesThe locked file, in object storage (Cloudflare R2)The readable file
Names and previewsLocked file and folder names, thumbnails and photo detailsReadable names, previews, places or dates
Recovery keyShown to you onceA second copy of your Master Key, locked by the recovery keyThe recovery key itself
Passkey unlockFor each passkey you addYour Master Key, locked by the passkey: emk_passkeyThe secret your passkey releases (WebAuthn PRF)
Contact deliveriesOne per contactWhat you prepared, sealed with their key: encrypted_bundleTheir access key, unless you choose to have Henedo email it
AccountYour email address, readable, so you can sign inYour vault password. Your sign-in password is kept only as a one-way hash

Your choices

A few conveniences, and exactly what they share.

Some features need our systems to read something. Each one is optional or has a private alternative, and none of it applies unless you use it.

AI help with your Book of Life

When you compose your book, the writing you choose for it travels through our servers to Anthropic, which drafts it: your written Life Story answers, the perspectives people wrote for you and the web stories you saved, and any journal entries, Ask answers or Legacy Inbox memories you switch on. Writing help sends the words you select, with your instruction and the sentences around them, to OpenAI for a suggested change you accept or reject. Nothing is sent without your consent, voice and video never are, and the finished book is encrypted under a key only your vault can open before it is stored.

Under the hood

Processed in memory; Henedo keeps no readable copy. The book request also carries your date of birth, if you added one. If OpenAI is unavailable or declines a passage, Anthropic writes the suggestion instead. Web-story drafting likewise sends the pages you choose to import, with your consent, to the providers named in our Privacy Policy.

Henedo emails an access key

You normally give each contact their key yourself. If you ask Henedo to email it instead, our servers and email provider see it once, and it then sits in their inbox.

Under the hood

Sent directly and never written to our mail queue. Your own email app, a share sheet or a printed copy keeps the key out of our systems entirely.

A Capsule Henedo delivers

Unless you choose otherwise, Henedo delivers a Capsule on the day, so we keep its opening link until then and our systems could open it. Choose to hand the link over yourself and Henedo never holds it.

Under the hood

With Henedo delivery the link’s secret is stored encrypted with a server-held key and emailed on the date. With hand-over delivery, only the link without its secret reaches us. A reply to your Capsule is sealed in its writer’s browser to the keys our server provides.

The questions you send with Ask

The questions you write are readable by our systems, so the person answering can read them without an account. Their answers are sealed in their browser to your keys, and reach your legacy contacts only according to the access you give each of them.

Under the hood

Answers use the same hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 sealing as partner sharing. Links you share yourself carry your key fingerprint; links Henedo emails rely on the keys our server provides.

Access

Getting in, on your terms.

You can always get back into your vault without asking us, and you decide who else gets in. Every path uses keys that stay on your devices or with the people you trust.

Your recovery key

A 64-character key shown once when you set up your vault. Keep it on paper or in a password manager: it opens your vault if you forget your vault password.

Under the hood

32 random bytes. HKDF turns them into a key that unlocks a second copy of your Master Key; Henedo stores only that locked copy.

Passkeys

Unlock with Face ID, Touch ID or your device PIN instead of typing your vault password.

Under the hood

WebAuthn PRF: your authenticator releases a secret only after you verify, and HKDF turns it into a key for another copy of your Master Key. Passkeys are tied to henedo.com.

A new phone or computer

Show a pairing code on a device that is already unlocked, scan it with the new one or send it the link, then approve. No password travels. A locked device can also ask your other devices to do this.

Under the hood

The secret rides after the # in the link, which browsers never send to servers. It works once and expires after five minutes. A request from a locked device carries nothing secret: the key only ever leaves the unlocked one.

Recovery shares

Split your recovery key among people you trust, so that a number you choose can rebuild it together, while fewer learn nothing at all.

Under the hood

Shamir secret sharing, done in your browser. The shares never reach Henedo; we only record that you split your key.

Sharing with your household

Shared files are sealed separately for each member. The first time on each device, you compare a safety number together, so no one can slip in a fake key.

Under the hood

Hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 for each member, combined with HKDF into an AES-256-GCM wrapping key. Shared items carry Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 signatures.

Delivering to your contacts

What you prepare for each person is sealed with their own access key and signed by you, so they can tell it is genuine before they open it.

Under the hood

AES-256-GCM under each contact’s key, with Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 signatures that must both verify. Their browser proves it holds the key without sending it.

Quantum-ready

Built for computers that don’t exist yet.

Large quantum computers could one day break the maths behind much of today’s internet security, and someone could record encrypted data now to try later. Henedo chooses methods that resist that, including the standards NIST published in 2024. They reduce known risks; they cannot guarantee the future.

The algorithms Henedo uses, in plain words
What it doesIn plain wordsAlgorithmAgainst quantum computers
Locks your contentA lock with a tamper seal. A quantum computer would only halve its strength, which still leaves it far out of reach.AES-256-GCMResistant
Protects your vault passwordTurns your password into a key slowly, with 128 MiB of memory for every try, and our server checks each try with a key kept outside the database. Only passwords estimated to need ten billion guesses are accepted.Argon2idHKDF-SHA-256HMAC-SHA-256As strong as your password
Shares a key with someoneTwo different padlocks on one box, one classic and one built for the quantum era. Opening it means breaking both.X25519ML-KEM-768Hybrid
Proves who made somethingTwo signatures from different families of maths. Both must check out before your contacts open what you left them.Ed25519ML-DSA-65Hybrid
Fingerprints dataShort fingerprints that change completely if a single byte changes, used to check files and keys.SHA3-512SHA-256BLAKE3Resistant
Signs our app releasesProves that an app release came from Henedo. Moving it to a post-quantum signature is still to do.Ed25519Not yet

If something goes wrong

What an attacker would get, case by case.

Security is measured by what still holds when something fails. Here is each case, including the ones encryption cannot solve, and the limit of every layer that protects you.

What each kind of attack would expose
If someoneWhat they would getYour vault content
Copies our databaseAccount details, the information listed above, and contact details that stay encrypted unless they also take the separate key. They cannot test guesses of your vault password: that needs a key that is never stored in the database.Safe
Copies our file storageLocked files and their sizes.Safe
Intercepts your connectionTraffic protected by HTTPS, carrying content that was already locked.Safe
Records everything for a future quantum computerContent locked with AES-256 and shares sealed with hybrid post-quantum keys.Designed to hold
Works inside Henedo or steals our server keysAccount and contact details, and anything you chose to let us handle in the section above. With both our database and the key that checks vault passwords, they could try guessing your vault password offline, each guess costing the full 128 MiB Argon2id work. With Extreme protection there is no password to guess.Safe with a strong vault password
Ships a tampered version of the appWhatever you type or open afterwards, including your vault password. This is the weak point of every web app; signed releases and published file fingerprints make tampering detectable.At risk
Learns both your passwordsWith Normal, your vault from any browser, and you get an email the first time their device opens it. With Advanced, nothing without your authenticator code. With Extreme there is no vault password to learn.Depends on your level
Gets into your emailWith Normal, your account through a reset of your sign-in password, and the details listed above; your vault still needs your vault password, a passkey or your recovery key. With Advanced, nothing without your authenticator code, unless you turned on emailed recovery codes. A support reset asked for from your inbox waits 3 days and also writes to your verified backup email, where you can cancel it.Safe with a strong vault password
Gets into a contact’s emailBefore delivery, their invitation, and their access key if Henedo emailed it, which opens nothing yet. After it, only what that contact receives, and only if their access key is in the same inbox.Mostly safe
Puts malware on your own deviceWhat you open on that device. No online service can prevent this.At risk
Every layer, with its limit stated
LayerWhat it doesWhere it stops
Sign-in and sessionsEvery signed-in request needs a live session. Once two-factor is on, our servers and database refuse a session that has not entered the code, apart from the few steps that spend a recovery code, finish a reset you confirmed by email, or email you. When a check cannot run, the action is refused.A passkey that unlocks your vault does not replace the sign-in code, and the code never opens your vault.
Protection levelKept and checked by our servers. Advanced and Extreme cannot be chosen without two-factor, and two-factor cannot be removed while they are on. Every change is logged, and lowering your level emails you.A session that has entered the code can lower the level without further proof, which is why lowering is logged and emailed. Recovery codes, emailed codes if you turned them on, and a support reset you confirmed still switch two-factor off, so a lost phone does not lock you out; the level then shows as unfinished until you set up an authenticator again.
New-device emailsThe first time a device opens your vault with your password, a passkey or your recovery key, at any level, we email you. Password unlocks are checked by our server, so no modified app can skip the email.Passkey and recovery-key unlocks are reported by your browser, and pairing, which you approve yourself, sends no email. A device is known by its browser storage, so someone using your own browser is not new, and a private window always is.
Changing vault keysChanging your vault password, recovery key or Master Key, or removing your vault password for Extreme protection, asks you to confirm your sign-in password first.Accounts that only sign in with Google confirm with a Google sign-in or an authenticator code from the last five minutes instead.
Vault password checksEach vault password try is checked by our server with a key kept outside our database, and every try counts: there is no other way to test a guess. After five wrong tries, each next try waits longer, up to a day. Five wrong tries within seven days of the first email you, at most once a day and however often you unlock in between, and your next unlock tells you how many were tried.Someone holding both our database and that key can guess offline, each guess costing the full Argon2id work. Extreme protection removes the password: only your passkeys, recovery key and paired devices open the vault, and no one can restore access if you lose them all.
Secure recordsWallet recovery phrases, logins and private notes are encrypted on your device, padded so ordinary records share one size, hidden on screen until revealed, and delivered only to the people you choose. Your will points to them and never holds the secret.Once revealed, a secret is on screen and can be copied. A record is only as safe as the ways into your vault.
Master Key isolationThe unlocked Master Key stays in a separate background worker; the page only gets a handle to it. To keep your vault open across a reload, the tab holds a copy locked under a key the browser will not export, until your idle timer runs out; you can turn this off in Settings. Locking clears both.Code running on henedo.com can still ask that worker to decrypt, or read what you open.
App integrityEach release is signed offline by Henedo and lists a SHA-384 fingerprint for every file. The scripts and styles a page starts with carry those fingerprints, and your browser refuses them if they differ.Files loaded later are checked only by the Transparency page, which runs inside the app it checks. All of it rests on our signing key and release process.
Outside codeNo script from another company runs on henedo.com: the page’s security policy allows scripts from henedo.com alone. The human check at sign-in (Cloudflare Turnstile) runs in its own frame on verify.henedo.com, which cannot reach the page or your keys.Our own code is still trusted in full, which is what App integrity is for.
Server checksEvery signed-in request is checked against your session and what you own, and against your plan where limits apply; public links are checked against their own tokens. Stored data is encrypted at rest.These checks protect access and metadata; the privacy of your content rests on the encryption above.
Recovery key setupYou confirm you saved your recovery key and type back one group of it, chosen at random, before it counts. A replacement changes nothing until you confirm it.A successful check today does not prove the copy will still exist later.
Kept copiesA recipient who chooses Keep creates a separate encrypted copy in their own account.Revoking a grant, removing a contact or deleting the source cannot recall that copy, a download or a forwarded copy.

Glossary

The words on this page, in plain language.

Security has its own vocabulary. These are the terms this page uses, each in one or two sentences.

End-to-end encryption

Data is locked by the sender and unlocked only by the intended reader. Everyone in between, us included, sees only the locked form.

Zero-knowledge

A service that stores your data without being able to read it, because the keys never reach it.

Encryption key

A long random number that locks and unlocks data. Henedo’s keys are 256 bits long, far beyond any computer to guess.

Master Key

The key at the centre of your vault. It unlocks every file’s key, and it is itself locked by your password, recovery key or passkey.

AES-256-GCM

The encryption standard trusted by governments and banks. GCM adds a seal that reveals any change to the locked data.

Argon2id

A deliberately slow, memory-hungry way to turn a password into a key, so each guess costs an attacker real time and money.

Post-quantum

Methods designed to stay secure against future quantum computers. NIST published the first standards in 2024.

Hybrid encryption

A classic method and a post-quantum one used together, so an attacker has to break both.

Digital signature

A seal only its owner can make and anyone can check. It proves who made something and that nothing changed since.

Hash

A short fingerprint of data. Change a single comma and the fingerprint changes completely.

Passkey

A secret kept by your phone or computer and released with your face, fingerprint or device PIN.

Two-factor authentication

A second proof at sign-in besides your password: here, a six-digit code from an authenticator app that changes every 30 seconds.

Recovery key

A long random key you keep on paper or in a password manager. It opens your vault if you lose every other way in.

Safety number

A short code two people compare to confirm they hold each other’s real keys, so no one in between can swap one in.

Secret sharing

Splitting a secret into pieces so that a chosen number of them rebuild it, while fewer reveal nothing.

Metadata

Information about your data rather than the data itself, such as a file’s size or the date it was added.

Preservation

Your encrypted vault, kept for the people you chose.

Normally the Living Vault is kept 60 days after Trusted Delivery activates. With Preservation, the term begins when Trusted Delivery activates and runs for 100 UTC calendar years from that date.

PriceOne-time purchase, separate from a Living membership
$899 once
Preserved capacityOne per account, the same as a Solo membership
100 GiB
TermFrom the date Trusted Delivery activates, instead of 60 days. Requires continuing operations
100 years
CoverageNothing to seal. Kept even past its capacity at activation. Vault folders, or files in no folder, that you leave out keep the 60-day window
Whole vault by default
StorageEncrypted in your browser before upload. One provider today; no independent second copy yet
Cloudflare R2
If your membership endsCancelling your membership does not cancel Preservation
Preservation stays
KeepsakeYour encrypted export on an archival disc, posted to you. It opens only with your recovery key; Henedo holds no key that opens it
One included
ReserveSet aside from each purchase in a separate account held by Henedo until an independent foundation exists. Not a trust, not invested
$300

If Henedo disappears

A documented format

Recovery without Henedo needs the complete encrypted content, its manifest, the decryption tools and the right keys. Keep your own copies of original files and recovery material.

Replaceable providers

Adapters separate selected database, storage, authentication and email operations. Moving still needs migration work and complete acceptance testing.

Planned

Reserve and custody

An independently held reserve, an archival custodian and a wind-down transfer are planned and do not exist yet. No investment returns are promised.

Compliance and review

Where we stand, stated plainly.

No certification is claimed, and none of the planned reviews is contracted yet; we name each institution when we sign. What you can check today is the published architecture and the signed build log.

Not certified

SOC 2 Type II

No completed SOC 2 report is asserted for this release.

Review required

GDPR

EU-only data residency is not yet in place and no DPO is appointed. The Privacy Policy names a privacy contact.

Review required

CCPA

Henedo does not sell your data, and you can request access to the account data we hold. Deletion cannot recall copies recipients kept.

Planned

Penetration testing

No tester is engaged yet. A summary will be published on the Transparency page after the first test.

Planned

Cryptography review

An annual review of primitives and protocol design by a university department. Not yet engaged.

Planned

Archival science review

Archival practice checked against OAIS (ISO 14721) and PREMIS. No department is contracted yet.

Planned

Estate law research

Template accuracy with estate planning law clinics. None is engaged yet; complex estates need a lawyer.

Not yet published

Transparency report

No annual report or current warrant-canary assertion yet. Incident-notification commitments still require approval.

Verify it yourself

Don’t trust us. Check.

Browser tools and the published spec let you examine the encryption and the signed files yourself. They do not prove how our servers behave or how we will operate in the long run.

Watch the network tab

Upload a file with your browser’s developer tools open. The file body travels as application/octet-stream ciphertext; its size and type go separately, as metadata.

Inspect the key boundary

The old storage slots hrd_mk_v2 and hrd_mk stay empty even while your vault is open. The worker hands the page an ID, never key bytes.

Decrypt without us

SECURITY.md sets out the key hierarchy and how each key is derived and wrapped, every export carries the exact recipe for its own keys, and the offline decryptor opens a complete export with your recovery key, without Henedo.

Check the signed build

Each signed release publishes a SHA-384 fingerprint of every HTML, JavaScript, CSS and WASM file in a manifest signed by Henedo. The Transparency page checks the files you were served against it.

Found something? Send the affected version, trust boundary and a safe reproduction on accounts and data you control to security@henedo.com. The absence of a report is not proof of security, and any reward requires a separately published programme.

Guides

Further reading, at your own pace.

Practical guides from our blog, free to read and useful whether or not you choose Henedo.

Questions

Frequently asked

[ Begin ]

Keep what matters under keys you control.

Start free with Witness: every feature and 2 GiB, no card. Choose a Living membership for more room and people, or add Preservation to keep your vault 100 years after Trusted Delivery activates.