Architecture
One product. Six subsystems. Understand the boundaries.
Documents, memories and delivery live in one product. Its modules separate responsibilities but share browser code, sessions and infrastructure, and that shapes what encryption protects.
Separation
Signing in is not unlocking.
More features create more flows to review: input, encryption, sharing, recovery and deletion. Henedo keeps three authorities apart.
Account authentication
Your account password signs you in to Henedo.
Vault decryption
A separate vault password, checked by our server with a key kept outside the database, or a recovery method you prepared, opens private content.
Recipient access
Recipient grants and the keys you hand over independently decide what another person can receive.
Subsystems
Six subsystems, each with a distinct job.
The Journal, Life Story, voice memos and video messages are not separate subsystems. They use Vault crypto, with the envelope defined for each content format.
Will builder
A versioned record of wishes with authenticated content and signed finalization. Legal execution and validity in any jurisdiction are not established.
What it touches
Plaintext form input, encrypted in place by the vault module before it is saved.
If it fails
It uses worker operations, not raw master-key bytes, but its form data is plaintext in the page. A script compromise can affect that data and misuse cryptographic operations.
Vault crypto
Per-file keys (FEKs) wrapped under a single master key (MK), with AES-256-GCM at rest.
What it touches
File bytes and file keys during encryption and decryption. Master-key operations run in a worker.
If it fails
A bug can affect encryption or key handling. Confidentiality also depends on the page code that handles inputs, plaintext and cryptographic requests.
Trusted Delivery
A server-side state machine: ACTIVE → WARNED → TRIGGERED → DELETED.
What it touches
Release state, timestamps, grant metadata and notification queues. Key handoff is separate from notifications.
If it fails
A bug can release ciphertext at the wrong time or delay access. Someone already holding the opening key could then decrypt it, so timing is part of confidentiality.
Transparency verifier
Optional verification of a signed build manifest and the assets it covers.
What it touches
Asset hashes and a public key.
If it fails
A faulty or replaced verifier can miss tampering. Independent verification needs a separately trusted key and tool, and a signature does not prove the application is safe.
Contact PII layer
Server-side pgcrypto AES-256 with an HMAC-SHA-256 blind index for emails.
What it touches
Legacy contacts’ names, emails, phone numbers and addresses. It has no intended role in deriving content keys.
If it fails
A dump without decryption authority holds encrypted PII, but privileged database or runtime access can decrypt it. Blind indexes reveal equality, and a bug here can expose personal information.
Failure modes
When a component fails.
The impact depends on the defect and the authority of the affected component. These examples name risks; they do not promise that failures stay inside one module.
| Defect | Confidentiality | Availability | Integrity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will builder bug | Readable form data may be exposed | Draft may fail to save | Incorrect wishes may be recorded |
| Vault crypto bug | Keys or plaintext may be exposed | Files may become unreadable | Incorrect framing or key use may break verification |
| Trusted Delivery timer bug | Premature access for a key holder | Release may be delayed | Incorrect state or notification |
| Transparency verifier bug | Malicious code may go undetected | Optional verification may fail | Audit result may be inaccurate |
| Contact PII layer bug | Personal information may be exposed | PII reads or delivery may fail | Identity lookup may be incorrect |
Shared surface
What every feature shares.
Features share the document context, API transports, sessions and backend authority. A review has to follow those boundaries as well as the code.
Shared cryptography
Versioned helpers share algorithms and parameters, and compatibility checks help protect existing ciphertext when code changes. Algorithm standards do not establish an independent audit or certification of Henedo.
- Content encryption
AES-256-GCM- Password stretching
Argon2id- Vault password checkServer-held key, never stored in the database
HMAC-SHA-256- Key derivation
HKDF- Signatures
Ed25519+ML-DSA-65- LibrariesEach implements a different part of the stack
- Web Crypto,
hash-wasm, pinned@noble/*
Cross-feature data flows
Sharing and Trusted Delivery create new artifacts under recipient keys. Your sharing choices and Trusted Delivery assignments decide what is included. Once someone downloads or saves a copy, removing the original grant cannot erase that independent copy.
Private vault encryption and many cross-feature handoffs stay in your browser. Account and delivery data are processed on the server, and optional AI features process the readable inputs you consent to send.
The worker isolates raw master-key memory; rendered plaintext still lives in the page. Encrypted browser state, with a locally stored wrapping key, can resume your session after a refresh until your chosen idle timeout. That convenience depends on browser storage and does not protect against malicious page code.
Preservation
Encrypted cloud storage, kept for the long term.
Nothing is sealed. Preservation keeps the owner’s vault, everything stored in the account except what the owner chooses to leave out, for the people chosen in Trusted Delivery.
- PriceNo renewals
- $899 once
- Preserved capacityOne per account
- 100 GiB
- TermFrom the day Trusted Delivery activates, for everything kept, even past its preserved capacity
- 100 UTC calendar years
- Left out by the ownerVault folders, or files in no folder; delivered like the rest
- Standard 60-day window
- StorageOne provider today; no independent second copy yet
- Cloudflare R2
- KeepsakeThe owner export on an archival disc, read back before it ships; opens only with the recovery key
- One included
- ReserveRecorded per purchase and moved to a separate account held by Henedo; no foundation yet
- $300
Each recipient opens what the owner assigned them with their own access key, which the owner hands over. Notification email is separate from that key. Large downloads stream to disk in supported browsers.
Long-term preservation requires continuing operations and future migrations as technology changes. It is not a fixed ten-year hardware-refresh cycle, and it depends on cloud storage, access and delivery services.
Every Preservation includes one keepsake: the owner’s complete encrypted export written to an archival disc, currently M-DISC, which counts as made only when its read-back fingerprint matches the one built. It opens only with the owner’s recovery key, and Henedo never holds a key that opens it.
Verify
Check the claims yourself.
Use an independently trusted verifier and public key. A matching build does not establish correct behavior, a completed external audit or production approval.
Security architecture
The threat model, the encryption boundaries and their limits.
Transparency log
Compare covered asset bytes with a signed build, in your browser or with your own tools.
Questions
Frequently asked
Combining features can reduce manual data handoffs, but modular code alone does not guarantee security. Henedo encrypts private vault content in the browser and keeps raw master keys in a worker. Page modules share access to plaintext and cryptographic operations, and encrypted session resume retains a browser-local recovery capability. Server-side delivery and optional readable-data features have separate access boundaries.
A trust boundary separates components with different access to your data. The web app keeps raw master-key bytes in a dedicated worker and gives page code operation handles. Encrypted browser state, with a locally usable wrapping key, can resume an unlocked session after refresh until its idle timeout. Private vault file contents are encrypted before upload. Account and delivery details are processed by the service, and optional AI features send selected readable inputs after your consent. Worker isolation reduces direct key exposure; it is not a boundary against malicious page code, which can still use browser keys, request operations (including wrapping the master key under a key it chooses), or capture plaintext. Server-side API access also checks the bound live session, applicable MFA assurance, ownership and current grants. Service-role routes enforce these checks separately from row-level security.
The impact depends on which component fails and its access. The will builder handles plaintext and uses worker operations to encrypt it. Worker isolation prevents ordinary page code from directly reading private worker variables, but page modules share a security context: injected code can capture plaintext or misuse cryptographic capabilities. Server-side access controls and delivery policies must be assessed separately.
Shared, versioned cryptographic helpers reduce duplicated implementations and make compatibility checks easier. Henedo uses AES-256-GCM, Argon2id, HKDF, HMAC-SHA-256 and versioned signature/key-exchange formats. Standard algorithms do not establish an application audit or certification. Features also share page code, sessions and storage, so a review must follow those boundaries too.
The security documentation describes the intended boundaries and their limitations. A signed manifest lets an independently trusted verifier compare served asset bytes with a signed build. It does not prove that the code is correct, that every description matches it, or that modules cannot affect one another. An in-page verifier can also be replaced if the delivery origin is compromised.
The current Preservation offer is $899 once for 100 GiB of preserved capacity, one per account, with no renewals. Nothing is sealed: Preservation keeps the owner's vault, everything stored in the account, for the people chosen in Trusted Delivery, except the vault folders, and optionally the files in no folder, that the owner leaves out. Everything outside the vault's files is always kept. The preservation term begins when Trusted Delivery activates on the account and runs for 100 UTC calendar years from that date for everything kept, even when it exceeds the preserved capacity at activation. What was left out is delivered like the rest and erased after the standard 60-day window, behind the same notice and copy checks as any erasure after activation. Recipients open what the owner assigned them with the access key the owner gave them, and notification email is separate from that key. Cancelling membership does not cancel Preservation. Each Preservation includes one keepsake disc of the owner's encrypted export, which opens only with the owner's recovery key.
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Understand how your information is protected.
Read the security boundaries, recovery requirements and sharing limits before setting up your vault.