The crypto used by this page mirrors the production Henedo client byte-for-byte.
Anyone with a competent crypto library can re-implement it from this spec.
1. KEK = Argon2id(passphrase [+ ASK_hex for v2/v3], kdf_salt,
m=64MB (v1/v2) or 128MB (v3/v4), t=3, p=4)
→ HKDF-SHA-256('henedo-kek-v1'|'henedo-kek-v2'|'henedo-kek-v3'|'henedo-vault-kek-v4', 32 bytes)
The version is manifest.json → kdf.version; this page dispatches on it.
2. MK = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(KEK, EMK, mk_iv, AAD)
v4 AAD = UTF-8("henedo:vault-password:4:" + manifest.vault_id); no ASK.
v1/v2/v3 omit AAD. A v4 vault password is separate from account sign-in.
─ OR ─
recovery_aes_key = HKDF-SHA-256(recovery_raw, each kdf.recovery_hkdf_labels candidate)
MK = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(recovery_aes_key, emk_recovery, recovery_iv)
(The recovery-key path never changes across KDF versions.)
A key that fails exactly as written is retried with one character
changed, two neighbours swapped, one character added or removed, or two
look-alike characters changed. The GCM tag accepts only the real key.
─ OR ─
MK is whatever 32 bytes you stored offline.
3. For each encrypted file in the manifest:
FEK = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(MK, EFEK, fek_iv)
plaintext = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(FEK, ciphertext, file_iv)
4. File and folder names are decrypted with MK using
encrypted_file_name + file_name_iv / encrypted_name + name_iv.
Custom badge labels use encrypted_badge + badge_iv under MK; preset
palette ids (finance, health, legal, …) stay plaintext in `badge`.
5. Journal entries, Life Book, Life Story answers, and Will payloads are
AES-256-GCM ciphertexts encrypted directly under MK. Will payloads bind
{"table":"wills","version":N,"will_id":"
"}
as AAD (rows sealed before that binding carry none). A row whose data_iv
is the literal 'v0-plaintext' pre-dates client-side encryption:
encrypted_data is base64-wrapped UTF-8 JSON, not ciphertext.
6. Sealed archives: EVAK = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(MK, EEVAK, eevak_iv);
manifest = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(EVAK, encrypted_manifest, manifest_iv);
display_data (owner file tree + personal letter, envelope {v,iv,ciphertext})
= AES-256-GCM.decrypt(EVAK, ciphertext, iv) with AAD
'henedo-eternal-vault-display-data-v:'.
Legacy rows store that tree as a flat plaintext object instead.
7. Trusted Delivery copy (format henedo-contact-export-v1): the carrier
is checked with Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 over its ciphertext against the
owner keys saved with it, then
carrier = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(access_key, carrier.bin, carrier.iv)
and its sealed owner fingerprint must match those keys. Each part in
buckets/ is decrypted the same way and its signed envelope verified.
FEK = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(access_key, e_fek, e_fek_iv)
from the carrier entry, then each item in files/ and recordings/ is
opened like step 3 (framed items one 8 MiB frame at a time).
A voice answer's recording in media/ opens with the key its entry in
the Ask part carries ("audio", kind ask-answer):
answer_key = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(access_key, e_key, e_key_iv,
aad = 'henedo-bundle-media-v1:ask-answer::')
audio = AES-256-GCM.decrypt(answer_key, object[12:], iv = object[0:12])
A keepsake on more than one disc holds one export ZIP cut into numbered
parts (name.zip.001, name.zip.002, ...). Joined in order, byte for byte,
they are the original ZIP.
This page embeds its recovery libraries, including Argon2id and hybrid
envelope support for Ask, capsules and the replies written back to them.
AES-GCM and HKDF use Web Crypto.
No network connection is required.