# Henedo Security Last updated: 16 November 2026 Henedo is a private family memory and digital legacy service for your stories, voices, photos and documents, end-to-end encrypted and passed on to the people you choose. This document explains how Henedo protects what you keep: the cryptography, the threat model, the protection levels, what Henedo can and cannot read, how delivery to the people you choose is secured, and how to report a vulnerability. It is condensed from Henedo's internal engineering record and from the code. When the two ever disagree, the code is right and this document is corrected. The plain-language version is at [henedo.com/security](https://henedo.com/security/). The system design is at [henedo.com/architecture](https://henedo.com/architecture/), signed releases at [henedo.com/transparency](https://henedo.com/transparency/) and leaving with your data at [henedo.com/portability](https://henedo.com/portability/). ## 1. Scope **Covered.** The Henedo web client served from henedo.com, its Edge functions and database rules, the encrypted storage of your content, the formats Henedo writes (vault files, contact deliveries, exports) and the offline decryptor. **What end-to-end encryption covers here.** Private file and memory content is encrypted in your browser before upload, with keys Henedo never holds. This is a scoped content-confidentiality design, not a claim that every field or feature is zero-knowledge. The server handles account information, relationship and grant identifiers, delivery schedules, sizes and timestamps, contact details it can decrypt to send email, support correspondence, and text you explicitly send to an AI feature. Section 6 lists each one. **Not claimed here.** This document is not a certification. No independent security review, cryptography review or penetration test of Henedo has been completed yet; each is planned, and none is engaged today. Hosting operations such as backups, alerting and on-call response are not described as security controls here. Using algorithms standardised as FIPS 203, 204 and 205 does not mean a FIPS-certified module. ## 2. Security principles 1. **Content keys stay with you.** Private content keys are generated and used in the browser. Server permission and key possession are separate: Henedo's schedule decides when a delivery becomes available, and opening it needs the access key you handed over, which Henedo does not hold unless you ask it to email one. 2. **Every request proves who is asking.** A valid sign-in token alone does not authorise every operation. Private operations check a live, bound session, the required second factor, ownership and the current grant. Signed content is verified before it is opened. 3. **Recovery without hidden key exposure.** Your recovery key, passkeys and paired devices are prepared before they are needed. Resetting your sign-in password never resets or opens your vault. Keys already given out and copies already downloaded cannot be recalled. ## 3. Threat model | Threat | Control | Where it stops | | --- | --- | --- | | A copy of the database or file storage | Content and content keys are encrypted in the browser; contact details are encrypted separately with a server key | Metadata stays visible. A v5 vault password cannot be tested against a database copy, because the check needs a key that is not in the database. Older v1 to v4 password envelopes can be guessed offline at Argon2id cost. | | A weak vault password | Memory-hard Argon2id, a server check with a per-account attempt limit (v5), and a strength floor | Someone holding both a database copy and the hardening key can guess offline at full Argon2id cost, so strength still matters. Extreme protection removes the password. | | A stolen session | Bound sessions, required second factor, ownership and grant checks, step-up before sensitive changes | Revoking a session can take up to 180 seconds to reach every Edge route. | | Hostile script, a compromised web origin or an unlocked device | Content Security Policy, master key held in a dedicated worker, signed releases | Hostile page code can capture what you type or open and can ask the worker to use keys. No web service can fully prevent this. | | A substituted public key during sharing | Hybrid key exchange with safety numbers compared between people | People need a trusted channel to compare. Links Henedo emails for the Ask carry no fingerprint and trust the served keys on first use. | | A delivery released when it should not be | Weeks of warnings, required acceptance by a mail server, check-ins, cancellation | A mail server accepting a warning is not proof that a person read it. Cancelling cannot recall copies already downloaded. | | A tampered delivery or archive | Authenticated encryption and hybrid signatures checked before decryption | A valid signature proves who sealed it, not that its contents are true or legally valid. | The canary decoy tripwire described in earlier versions of this document was retired on 28 October 2026 and is not a current control. New post-quantum primitives do not upgrade ciphertext written before them. ## 4. Cryptography ### 4.1 Key hierarchy ``` Vault password (v5) ............ none under Extreme protection | Argon2id (128 MiB, t=3, p=4) and HKDF in the browser, | combined with H from the vault-password check (4.2) v KEK (256-bit, browser memory only, never stored) | +-- encrypts --> Master Key (MK, 256-bit random, generated once) | stored only as ciphertext (EMK) | | | +-- wraps --> a random key for every file (FEK) | +-- wraps --> a random access key for each legacy contact (COTK) | +-- wraps --> Ed25519, ML-DSA-65 and SLH-DSA signing keys | +-- wraps --> X25519 and ML-KEM-768 private keys for sharing | +-- passkey (WebAuthn PRF) --> an independent copy of the MK per passkey +-- recovery key (32 random bytes) --> an independent copy of the MK ``` Everything under the Master Key is symmetric: AES-256-GCM with a 12-byte random IV and a 128-bit tag. Files from 50 MiB, and recordings, are encrypted in 8 MiB frames, each bound to its position and to the frame count, so frames cannot be reordered, swapped or cut off. File names, folder names, thumbnails, and the date and place a photo was taken are encrypted the same way; a photo's place and date are sealed in a fixed-size record so its length gives nothing away. The asymmetric keys are used only to sign and to share a key with another person (4.4), never to protect your own data, which is why your own key chain needs no key-encapsulation step to resist quantum computers. ### 4.2 Vault passwords (KDF v5) Every vault password set today is a server-hardened v5 envelope. The vault password must differ from your sign-in password, and Henedo never receives it. Every HKDF below is HKDF-SHA-256 with a 32-byte zero salt and a 32-byte output: ``` browser S = HKDF(Argon2id(NFC(password), kdf_salt, 128 MiB, t=3, p=4), 'henedo-vault-stretch-v5') T = HKDF(S, 'henedo-vault-hardening-query-v5') sent with kdf_salt server M = HMAC-SHA-256(K[key_id], 'henedo-vault-hardening-v5' || 0x00 || user_id || 0x00 || kdf_salt || T) V = HKDF(M, 'henedo-vault-hardening-verifier-v5') stored, server-only H = HKDF(M, 'henedo-vault-hardening-output-v5') returned only on a match FP = HMAC-SHA-256(K[key_id], 'henedo-vault-hardening-key-fingerprint-v5')[0..8] browser KEK = HKDF(S || H, 'henedo-vault-kek-v5') EMK = AES-256-GCM(KEK, MK, AAD = 'henedo:vault-password:5:') ``` - **What it buys.** `K` is a versioned key ring held as an Edge function secret. It is never stored in the database, in the database's secret store or in backups, so a copy of the database holds nothing a password guess can be tested against. Because `S` enters the KEK, the server never holds an unlock key: even with the database and `K` together, Henedo would have to guess the password. - **One salt, one issuance.** `M` binds the envelope's salt. Every salt a hardening value was issued for is recorded, and a reused salt is refused, so the only way to test a guess is a counted unlock. - **Attempt policy.** Five wrong attempts in a row without a wait, then waits of 1, 4, 16 and 64 minutes, about 4 hours, about 17 hours, then 24 hours each. Only a correct or newly set password resets the wait, and the next unlock tells you how many wrong attempts came before it. Separately, the fifth wrong attempt within any rolling seven days emails you, at most once a day. - **Strength floor.** A vault password must be estimated to need at least 10^10 guesses (zxcvbn score 4, also checked with spaces and dashes removed). This bounds only an attacker who holds both a database copy and `K`. - **Older envelopes.** v4 envelopes (Argon2id 128 MiB, `henedo-vault-kek-v4`) stay readable and are no longer written. Legacy v1 to v3 envelopes keep their original recipes; v2 and v3 also need a device-held Account Secret Key. - **Every primitive is symmetric**, so the hardening adds no exposure to Shor's algorithm. OPAQUE was considered and rejected because a quantum attacker could recover an elliptic-curve OPRF key from one recorded exchange and resume offline guessing. ### 4.3 Algorithms | Purpose | Algorithm | | --- | --- | | Content and key wrapping | AES-256-GCM (12-byte IV, 128-bit tag) | | Vault password | Argon2id (128 MiB, 3 iterations, 4 lanes), HKDF-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-256 server hardening (v5) | | Recovery key | 32 random bytes, HKDF-SHA-256, AES-256-GCM | | Passkey unlock | WebAuthn PRF, HKDF-SHA-256, AES-256-GCM | | Legacy contact access keys | 32 random bytes, written as 44 base58 characters, MK-wrapped | | Sharing a key with another person | X25519 and ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203), combined with HKDF-SHA-256 | | Signatures on deliveries and shared items | Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), both required | | Signatures on legacy sealed archives (v3) | Ed25519, ML-DSA-65 and SLH-DSA-SHA2-192s (FIPS 205), all three required | | Archive integrity (v3) | BLAKE3-256 Merkle tree with RFC 6962 domain separation | | Vault envelope and archive manifest hash | SHA3-512 | | Release manifest | Ed25519 over SHA-384 file hashes | | Contact details at rest (server side) | PGP-AES-256 (pgcrypto) with a server-held key; HMAC-SHA-256 blind index for lookups | Each key family and version has its own registered HKDF `info` label, so the same input key material can never produce the same key for two purposes (RFC 5869, section 3.2). Labels are never reused across derivations. ### 4.4 Sharing between people A Household or Family member's shared files are sealed separately for each member. Every person publishes an X25519 public key and an ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key; both private halves are wrapped under that person's Master Key. - **Hybrid envelopes (v3, required for new envelopes).** The X25519 shared secret, the ML-KEM-768 shared secret and a SHA-256 hash of the transcript (ephemeral key, KEM ciphertext and both recipient public keys) go through HKDF-SHA-256 with the label `henedo-kex-hybrid-v3` to make the wrapping key. Opening one requires breaking both X25519 and ML-KEM-768, and an envelope copied into another member's slot fails its tag check. A member without published keys is reported as pending, never silently dropped. - **Older envelopes.** v1 (raw X25519) and v2 (X25519 with HKDF) envelopes stay readable and are never written by current clients. An unknown version is refused rather than guessed. - **Safety numbers.** The first time on each device, two people compare a safety number to confirm they hold each other's real keys. - **Who sealed it.** Each shared file and folder carries its owner's Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 signatures over the item and the digests of every recipient envelope. - **A Journal or Life Story shared with a member.** Once two members have compared safety numbers, the access key of what one shares with the other is wrapped to the other's own keys in the same hybrid envelope and signed by the owner, so the member reads it inside their own dashboard by signing in, with no key to type. Their browser checks the owner's signature and the key before reading anything; Henedo stores only the envelope and can read neither the key nor what it opens. A member whose safety number was not compared reads with the access link and key, as before. - **Changing formats is cheap.** Upgrading an envelope rewraps only the file key, a few hundred bytes. File ciphertext is never re-encrypted. ### 4.5 Post-quantum status | Component | Construction | Boundary | | --- | --- | --- | | Your content and key wrappers | AES-256-GCM | Symmetric; a quantum computer would at most halve its strength. | | New sharing envelopes | X25519 + ML-KEM-768 hybrid | Older classical envelopes stay readable with their original security. | | Ask answers | X25519 + ML-KEM-768 under `henedo-ask-answer-v1` | Older classical answers (`henedo-ask-answer-classical-v1`) stay readable; none are written. | | Contact deliveries and finalised wills | Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 | Required signatures fail closed. | | Legacy sealed archive roots | Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, with SLH-DSA-SHA2-192s on v3 | Verified as originally signed; an unsupported version fails. | | Release manifests | Ed25519 | Classical; a post-quantum release signature is still to do. | Verification requires every signature leg an artifact's version requires; it is never "either signature will do". These choices reduce known risks; they do not guarantee future security. ## 5. Protection levels and sign-in You choose a protection level when you create your vault and can change it later in Settings. | Level | What opens the vault | Sign-in | | --- | --- | --- | | Normal (default) | Vault password, passkey, recovery key or a paired device | Sign-in password or Google | | Advanced | As Normal | As Normal, plus an authenticator code: two-factor is mandatory | | Extreme | Passkey, recovery key or a paired device only: there is no vault password | As Advanced | - **Rules the server enforces.** Advanced and Extreme cannot be chosen without a verified authenticator. While either is on, two-factor cannot be turned off from Settings, and the database refuses removing the last verified factor by any other route. Every change is logged, and lowering the level emails you. - **Extreme protection (Maximum protection).** The password envelope and its server verifier are deleted. It needs a confirmed recovery key and a passkey first, and the database refuses to remove the last usable passkey of such a vault. If you lose every passkey, the recovery key and every unlocked device, no one, Henedo included, can restore access. - **New-device emails.** The first time a device opens your vault, at any level, Henedo emails your sign-in address with how the device describes itself, how the vault was opened and when. Your browser keeps a random secret and sends a per-account token made from it; the server stores only its SHA-256 hash. Password unlocks are checked by the server, so a modified client cannot skip the email. Passkey and recovery-key unlocks are reported by the browser. At most five such emails go out per account in 24 hours. A device is known by its browser storage, so someone using your own browser is not a new device, and a private window always is. - **Two-factor sign-in.** Authenticator codes (TOTP) with ten single-use recovery codes of 80 bits each, stored as SHA-256 digests. Once a factor is verified, Edge routes and every authenticated database request refuse a session that has not entered the code, apart from a short, listed set of steps that spend a code or send mail to your own address. Two-factor guards the session, never the vault: no key depends on it. - **A lost authenticator.** A recovery code switches two-factor off. Emailed recovery codes are an opt-in, valid for 15 minutes, with the stated cost that your mailbox alone can then get past two-factor. Without either, support can start a reset that changes only how you sign in: you confirm it from your sign-in address within 48 hours, it waits 72 hours with a cancel link in every letter, and you finish it with your sign-in password. Support can never remove a factor directly or reach a vault. - **Step-up before sensitive changes.** Changing your vault password, recovery key or Master Key, removing a passkey, and changing two-factor ask for your sign-in password again. An account without a password confirms with a Google sign-in or an authenticator code from the last five minutes. - **Sessions.** The Master Key lives in a dedicated worker; the page holds an opaque handle. The vault locks after 4 hours idle by default (adjustable from 1 minute to 8 hours), and on sign-out, manual lock or worker failure. ## 6. What Henedo can and cannot read **Never readable by Henedo:** - your files and photos, their names, folder names and previews; - where and when a photo was taken; - journal entries, voice notes and videos; - your will, Life Story answers and Book of Life; - your private records of people and places; - the answers your family gives to your Ask questions; - secure records: wallet recovery phrases, logins and private notes; - what you prepare for each legacy contact; - what is inside a time capsule, unless you ask Henedo to deliver it (below); - what people write back to your capsules. **Handled by Henedo's systems:** - your email address, name, phone number and date of birth; - names and contact details of the people you add, and the questions you send through the Ask; - who you are connected to, and a capsule's title, file names, recipient and delivery date; - file sizes, file types, dates and how your folders are arranged; - when you check in, and where Trusted Delivery stands; - your protection level, and the devices that opened your vault as each browser describes itself; - copies of the emails Henedo sends, for up to 180 days; - billing details, which Stripe processes; - your IP address and browser, for security, until 90 days after a session ends. Contact details, capsule recipients and titles, and Ask questions are encrypted at rest with a key the server holds, so a stolen backup does not reveal them, while the running service can decrypt them to send email. Email is the only channel the server sends on; there is no letter, SMS or push path anywhere in the product. **Features that read only what you choose to send them:** - **AI help with your Book of Life.** With your consent, the writing you choose for your book passes through Henedo's servers to Anthropic, which drafts it. Writing help sends the words you select, with your instruction and the sentences around them, to OpenAI for a suggested change, and to Anthropic only when OpenAI is unavailable or declines. A web story sends the public pages you add to Jina Reader or Firecrawl to be read, and their text to Anthropic to draft it. Voice and video are never sent, Henedo keeps no readable copy, and the finished book is encrypted under a key only your vault opens before it is stored. Henedo does not train AI models on your content. - **Henedo emails an access key.** You normally hand each legacy contact their key yourself. If you ask Henedo to email it instead, its servers and email provider see it once; it is sent directly and never written to the mail queue. - **A capsule Henedo delivers.** Unless you choose to hand the link over yourself, Henedo keeps a capsule's opening link, encrypted with a server-held key, until the delivery date, so its systems could open that capsule. - **The questions you send with the Ask** are readable so the person answering needs no account. Their answers are sealed in their browser to your keys. ## 7. Delivery and inheritance security ### 7.1 Trusted Delivery is a policy gate, not a cipher Trusted Delivery releases what you prepared to the people you chose after a period of inactivity you set. Encryption decides who can read; the server's schedule decides when a delivery becomes available. It does not establish that anyone has died or become incapacitated, and no document sent to support starts it or brings it forward. ``` ACTIVE --(your interval: 30 days by default)--> first warning --(+14 days)--> second warning --(+14 days)--> final warning --(+7 days)--> activation --(at least 60 days, or 100 years with Preservation)--> Living Vault erased ``` - **The interval.** New accounts start at 30 days. A membership allows up to 365 days and Preservation up to 730. - **Check-ins.** Signing in, opening your dashboard while signed in, a vault write, opening the Trusted Delivery panel, or the confirm button in an emailed check-in link resets the counter. Merely opening a check-in link does not, and neither does a session created only by an emailed link, so a mail scanner cannot check you in. - **Warnings that must arrive.** Each warning waits until a mail server accepted the previous one, so a mail outage delays delivery rather than skipping a warning. A warning that fails permanently is retried with a fresh check-in link after 1, 3 and 7 days, and every permanent failure raises an operations alert; if your mailbox still refuses mail after the retries, the schedule continues on elapsed time. The final warning is never suppressed, which gives at least five weeks of warnings before anything is released. - **Cancelling.** Before activation, any check-in resets the cycle. After activation, the signed-in owner can cancel after confirming their sign-in password again (or a Google sign-in from the last five minutes), and the emergency cancel code can cancel too. The code is single-use and its use is announced to your sign-in and verified backup addresses. Either way cancelling is possible only within 60 days of activation; after that an activation is final for everyone, Henedo included. Cancelling cannot recall what was already downloaded. - **Account deletion.** While warnings are counting down, deleting the account needs an explicit second confirmation. After activation the server refuses it, so recipients keep their window. ### 7.2 Access keys and what each person receives - **One key per person.** Each legacy contact has their own random 256-bit access key, made in your browser and wrapped under your Master Key. You hand it over yourself, or ask Henedo to email it once. Henedo cannot recover, derive or reissue an access key, and there is no support path that can. - **Sealed and signed.** What you prepare for each person is encrypted under their key and signed with your Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 keys. Their browser checks both signatures before decrypting anything, and refuses a delivery that fails either. Secondary deliveries such as the will, journal and Life Story are signed with a version, their kind and the recipient bound in, and a browser refuses a version older than one it already opened. - **Proof of the key, without sending it.** A recipient's browser proves it holds the access key with an HMAC over a timestamp and fresh nonce, keyed by a one-way verifier of the key (`henedo-contact-key-proof-v1`). The server stores only the verifier, which opens nothing. A delivery prepared before 27 October 2026 gains the proof, and its secondary parts their signatures, the next time the owner's dashboard publishes it again. - **Sessions.** After the proof, a short-lived download session is issued; the server stores only the SHA-256 digest of its token. Key entry is rate limited. - **A key typed once.** When a recipient goes from their page to sign in or create an account to keep a copy, the key they typed waits in that browser tab for at most 15 minutes, encrypted under a key that cannot leave the browser. If confirming their email opens a new tab, that tab asks the browser's other Henedo tabs for it once: a tab holding it answers once, with a fresh envelope made for that request and never the key itself, and the new tab checks it exactly like a typed key before anything shows. Nothing new is stored on a server or sent over the network. When no tab answers, the page asks for the key once more. - **Before activation.** Your dashboard and every warning email list contacts with no recorded key handover and contacts with no prepared delivery, so you can fix either in time. ### 7.3 After activation - **The access window.** The Living Vault stays readable to activated recipients for at least 60 days, or for 100 years when you hold Preservation. Erasure also waits until every activated recipient's notice was accepted by a mail server, for at most 12 months after activation, and until 30 days have passed since the last one. A notice no mail server accepted by then is followed by a last letter to your verified backup address, and erasure waits 30 days after it. If a legacy contact has never entered their key when erasure is due, it waits once more, 30 days, and that contact, your backup address and the contacts who opened theirs are written to again. Recipients are told the date in their letter and reminded 30 and 7 days before it. The date can move later, never earlier, and no one at Henedo can extend it. - **Content freeze.** From activation until a delivery is cancelled, the server refuses every change your own account makes to your content, sharing and keys, and to your profile name and verified backup address. What people send through your links, such as Ask answers and capsule replies, can still arrive. - **Support.** Support never decrypts content, never activates a delivery and has no path to derive a contact's key. - **Keeping a copy.** A recipient can download what they received, or import a copy into a Henedo account of their own. Both can also hold the links to any capsules left for them, encrypted under keys Henedo never holds. - **What arrived later.** Your browser prepares what each person receives, so an Ask answer or a memory from a friend that reaches you after your last visit cannot be passed on. A recipient's page says how many arrived after their delivery was last prepared, counted by the server from dates it already holds, never what they say or who wrote them. - **After erasure.** For each legacy contact whose delivery had started, Henedo keeps only a SHA-256 digest of their link and the day it closed, so the link says that access has closed rather than that it was never found. The digest names no one and opens nothing. ### 7.4 Preservation and the keepsake disc Preservation keeps your Living Vault, and every recipient's access, for 100 years from activation instead of 60 days. Nothing about encryption changes: recipients use the same access keys and Henedo still holds no content key. Every Preservation includes one keepsake: your complete encrypted export on an archival disc, posted to you. The disc carries no password envelope, so a lost disc offers nothing to guess against; it opens only with your recovery key, which you write by hand on a key card kept apart from the disc. Storage is with one provider today, and no independent second copy, successor custodian or independent foundation exists yet. Part of each Preservation purchase is set aside in a separate account used only for preservation. That account belongs to Henedo Inc. until an independent foundation exists: it is not a trust, not invested and not protected from Henedo's creditors. Archives sealed under earlier terms keep their own formats and per-inheritor keys, and every signature their version requires is verified before anything is opened. ## 8. Ways back in | Path | How it works | Needs a server check? | | --- | --- | --- | | Vault password | The v5 check in 4.2 | Yes, and every try is counted | | Recovery key | A 64-character key shown once at setup; unlocks its own copy of the Master Key | No | | Passkey | WebAuthn PRF releases a secret after you verify on your device | No | | Pairing a new device | A code from an unlocked device; the secret travels after the `#` in the link, which browsers never send to servers, works once and expires after five minutes | No; the server only relays the encrypted handoff | | Recovery shares | Shamir secret sharing of the recovery key in your browser (3 of 5 by default); shares never reach Henedo | No | Henedo cannot reset your vault password or open your vault for you. Resetting your sign-in password never touches vault keys. New security-question escrow is retired; existing escrow keeps a 7-day delay with an emailed PIN and can be removed in Settings. Henedo no longer emails recovery keys. **The offline escape hatch.** An export holds your complete encrypted content, its manifest and a human-readable crypto-spec file with the exact recipe for its own keys. The standalone offline decryptor at [henedo.com/henedo-decrypt.html](https://henedo.com/henedo-decrypt.html) opens a complete export with your recovery key, without Henedo. A v5 vault password needs Henedo's check, so offline the recovery key is the way in. Offline access needs a complete export, a compatible browser and a working key; it is a recoverability mechanism, not a promise about media lifetimes. **The Legacy Package.** The export is a Legacy Package: everything you keep in Henedo in one encrypted package you hold, in several ZIP parts for a large vault, signed with your account's Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 keys, with its crypto-spec file and the offline reader inside. The reader opens it with your recovery key, its parts in any order, and opens what is there when a part is missing or did not finish saving. Before any key, a package shows only its format, its id, the day it was made, the account id, its key envelopes, how many stored files each part holds and their sizes, how many encrypted pages there are and their sizes, the size and SHA-256 of its notes and reader, and the signing public keys: no name, record date or link. Henedo lists the SHA-256 of every offline reader it builds at [henedo.com/portability](https://henedo.com/portability/). A life larger than one package can hold today is offered the earlier export instead, unsigned, and exports saved before packages keep opening as before. **Restore.** Restoring a package (Settings, Your data) only adds to your account and changes nothing already there. Your browser checks the package against its signatures and each file against its recorded hash, then encrypts everything again under your account's own keys. A package another account made opens only with that account's recovery key or vault password, and only after you confirm it is your own life. A restore sends nothing to anyone and never carries legacy contacts. ## 9. The code your browser runs - **Content Security Policy.** Served as an HTTP header: `default-src 'none'` and `script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'`, with no third-party script hosts, `frame-ancestors 'none'`, and connections only to Henedo's own origin, its database and storage endpoints and two map tile services. - **Third-party script stays out of this origin.** The origin that holds your device secret and unlocked keys never runs third-party script. Cloudflare Turnstile runs only in a separate frame on verify.henedo.com. Google Analytics runs only after you accept analytics, in a hidden, sandboxed frame on measure.henedo.com that receives cleaned page addresses and never your documents or storage; pages opened from a private link are never measured. - **Worker isolation.** The Master Key is generated and used inside a dedicated worker and leaves it only as ciphertext under a key the worker derived itself. This is defence in depth: hostile page code can still ask the worker to perform legitimate operations or read decrypted content. - **Signed releases.** Every production build lists the SHA-384 hash of every HTML, JavaScript, CSS and WASM file in a manifest, signed with an Ed25519 key that Henedo keeps offline and never places on a build server. The hosting pipeline only verifies a signed candidate and promotes its exact bytes, and script and stylesheet tags carry Subresource Integrity attributes. [henedo.com/transparency](https://henedo.com/transparency/) explains how to check the files you were served against the signed manifest. This detects files changed after signing; it cannot detect a malicious release signed with Henedo's own key, and a first visit has no earlier manifest to compare with. ## 10. Server side - Most operations run through Edge functions. A request's session, second factor and rate limits are checked before its body is read, bodies have size ceilings, and a server error (5xx) reaches the caller as generic text with a request id while the detail stays in a redacted log. - Direct database access is limited by grants and row-level security, together with a check that binds every request to a live application session and the required second factor. Tables only the service may touch have no client policies. - Rate limits key on the address Cloudflare reports for the caller, never on a header the caller can set. - Recipient session tokens and the tokens in emailed reset and cancel links are stored as SHA-256 digests. Sealed-archive link tokens travel in the URL fragment, so they never reach server, CDN or proxy logs. - Account erasure removes stored files before the database rows that index them, and a removal it cannot prove is retried rather than skipped. ## 11. Known limits - A tampered release or malware on your own device can capture what you type or open. Signed releases make the first detectable; no online service can prevent the second. - Someone holding both Henedo's database and the vault-password hardening key can guess vault passwords offline at full Argon2id cost. A strong vault password, or Extreme protection, is the answer. - Metadata is visible to Henedo: sizes, dates, folder arrangement, who you are connected to and when you check in. - Trusted Delivery depends on Henedo's scheduler and mail delivery running. A mail server's acceptance is not proof that a person read a message. - Cancelling a delivery or removing a contact cannot recall content already downloaded or a key already handed over. - Revoking a session can take up to 180 seconds to reach every Edge route. ## 12. Reporting a vulnerability Email [security@henedo.com](mailto:security@henedo.com). The machine-readable policy is at [henedo.com/.well-known/security.txt](https://henedo.com/.well-known/security.txt) (RFC 9116). - **In scope:** henedo.com and its subdomains, the Henedo web client, the cryptographic design described here and the binary transparency mechanism. - **Out of scope:** denial of service, phishing of Henedo staff, physical attacks and social engineering. - **Please include** the affected URL or component, steps to reproduce and the impact you observed. Do not access, change or delete other people's data, and stop once you have shown the issue. - **Encrypting your report.** No report-encryption key is published yet. The Ed25519 key at [henedo.com/.well-known/transparency-key.pub](https://henedo.com/.well-known/transparency-key.pub) signs release manifests only and cannot encrypt a report. Henedo welcomes coordinated disclosure of security vulnerabilities. ## 13. Changelog - **16 November 2026.** Erasure waits once more for a legacy contact who never opened their delivery, and a notice no mail server accepted holds it for at most 12 months. Your profile name and backup address are frozen with your content after activation. A recipient's typed key survives an email confirmation opened in a new tab, their page counts what arrived after their delivery was last prepared, and their link says that access has closed after erasure. - **15 November 2026.** The export becomes a signed Legacy Package that can be restored into your own account, and a Household or Family member whose safety number you compared reads what you share with them by signing in. - **13 November 2026.** This curated public version replaces the full engineering record previously served at this address. - **7 November 2026.** Content is frozen from activation until a delivery is cancelled. Support has no route to start or bring forward a delivery on documents, or to extend retention. - **3 and 4 November 2026.** Protection levels (Normal, Advanced, Extreme) and new-device vault emails. A Google-only account that turns on two-factor also adds a sign-in password. - **30 October 2026.** Server-hardened v5 vault passwords and Maximum protection. v4 envelopes become read-only. - **28 October 2026.** The Living Vault is kept at least 60 days after activation. Preservation keeps the Living Vault for 100 years instead of sealing a snapshot. The canary decoy tripwire is retired. - **27 October 2026.** A fix pass followed eight internal reviews that compared this document with the code: warning retries, erasure that waits for every recipient's notice, billing closure at activation, a single-use emergency code, proof of access-key possession, signed secondary deliveries, offline release signing covering every HTML document, Google hosts removed from the Content Security Policy, and step-up for every vault-key change. - **24 September 2026.** Sign-in separated from browser-only vault decryption, portable vault passwords for new vaults, hybrid encryption with authenticated recipient keys required for new sharing, and emailed recovery keys retired.